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1. Introduction
I am pleased to have the opportunity to comment on Yun Xie's very interesting and instructive
paper. He reports that "the notion of [an] on-balance premise has been recognized by many
scholars as a vital tool in understanding the logical structure of the third-pattern conduction…. The
basic idea is that in each third-pattern conductive argument there is always an implicit on-balance
premise which states a judgment that the positive reasons adduced for the conclusion have
outweighed the counter-considerations mentioned in the argument" (p. 2).
In section 2, I consider Xie's argument for the claim that "the notion of [an] on-balance
premise has only a restricted applicability in structuring the third-pattern conductive arguments"
(p. 7). In section 3, I comment on a criticism Xie makes of Hansen's view that the argument schema
'k even though q; because p' implies that p is a stronger consideration than q; having done so, I
make other comments related to the schema. In section 4, I consider two examples of on-balance
legal reasoning.
2. Outweighing and undercutting
Xie says that "the notion of defeater as defined by Pollock is very close to the understanding of
counter-consideration in the discussions on conduction" (p. 5). He notes that Pollock distinguishes
between "rebutting defeaters [which] attack the conclusion of a defeasible inference" and
"undercutting defeaters [which] attack the defeasible inference itself" (p. 5). Xie goes on to say
that "the distinction between rebutting and undercutting defeaters can also be drawn for counterconsiderations … in conductive arguments" (p. 6). He gives two examples in which "by
mentioning the counter-considerations the arguer is acknowledging some concern that would lead
directly to the falsity (or the opposite) of the conclusion," and two examples in which "the arguer
is … conceding some concern that … would … attack the inference from the supportive reason
to the conclusion" (p. 6, omissions his).
Xie believes that "in light of this parallel between defeaters and counter-considerations, we
could find that an outweighing relation based merely on collective strength now becomes
inadequate in characterizing the ways of arguing in the third-pattern conductions" (p. 6). The
"collective strength" Xie is referring to here is that of the "positive reasons" for the conclusion of
a third-pattern conduction as compared to the collective strength of the counter-considerations –
the reasons against the conclusion.
He adds that "an outweighing relation makes sense only when we are considering two (sets
of) reasons that support respectively conflicting conclusions (A and not-A), because it is only in
this situation that we are going to take into account their own weight (or degree of support) and to
determine which one is stronger" (p. 6). In Xie's view,
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an outweighing relation based on collective strength is not appropriate for
understanding those conductive arguments that include counter-considerations of a[n]
undercutting type [i.e., the type that "attack" the defeasible inference from the positive
reasons to the conclusion], because the weight of an undercutting counterconsideration is in support of neither the conclusion nor its opposite[;] thus it cannot
be compared with that of the supportive reasons, no matter individually or collectively.
Therefore, … the metaphor of outweighing cannot characterize the process of
weighing in conductive arguments in a comprehensive manner, for it overlooks the
fact that supportive reasons and counter-consideration[s] can interact in different ways.
Accordingly, the notion of on-balance premise has only a restricted applicability in
structuring the third-pattern conductive arguments (p. 7).
This is a forceful argument. In response, I will begin by noting a further point Xie makes,
namely that if one of two reasons "is in support of A while the other [is] in support of B, their
weights, even though … both [could] be measured in degree, are not comparable[;] hence to [say]
… one of them outweighs the other would be misleading and inappropriate" (p. 7). By way of
illustration, Xie revisits an example he gave earlier in which an inference is made from the premise
"the movie is ideal for children" to the conclusion "you ought to take your son to the movie" (p.
5). An undercutting defeater of this argument would be the information that "'your son doesn't like
popular children['s] movies'" (p. 5, omissions his). When he returns to this example, Xie says:
"given that 'your son doesn't like popular children['s] movies' would be a reason in support of not
drawing the conclusion 'you ought to take your son to the movie' from the premise 'the movie is
ideal for children', then it will be confusing to say that the reason … 'your son doesn't like popular
children['s] movies' is stronger than the reason … 'the movie is ideal for children', for they are in
support of different claims, thus not comparable in their weights" (p. 7).
The first of the following arguments corresponds to the claim that 'the movie is ideal for children'
supports the conclusion 'you ought to take your son to the movie' and the second corresponds to
the claim that 'your son doesn't like popular children's movies' (conjoined with the tacit claim that
the movie is a popular children's movie) would be a reason in support of not drawing the conclusion
'you ought to take your son to the movie' from the premise 'the movie is ideal for children.'
Argument 1:
The movie is ideal for children.
Therefore,
You ought to take your son to the movie.
Argument 2:
Your son doesn't like popular children's movies.
The movie is a popular children's movie. (tacit premise)
Therefore,
You shouldn't draw the conclusion 'you ought to take your son to the movie' from the
premise 'the movie is ideal for children.'
The conjunction of the premises of Argument 2 undercuts the inference in Argument 1 (cf. Xie, p.
5).
These two arguments taken together constitute a case of the type in which one of two (sets of)
reasons "is in support of A while the other [is] in support of B" (p. 7). Thus, Xie would say that it
2

isn't a case of the type in which an outweighing relation makes sense, because it isn't a case in
which two (sets of) reasons support "respectively conflicting conclusions (A and not-A)" (p. 6).
At issue in the movie example is whether or not you ought to take your son to the movie. A
proponent of Argument 2 could expand the argument as follows:
Argument 2*
Your son doesn't like popular children's movies.
The movie is a popular children's movie. (tacit premise)
Therefore,
You shouldn't draw the conclusion 'you ought to take your son to the movie' from the
premise 'the movie is ideal for children.'
Rather, you should draw the opposite conclusion, namely that it isn't the case that
you ought to take your son to the movie.
Argument 2* treats the conjunction of its premises as a reason for not drawing the conclusion 'you
ought to take your son to the movie' from the premise 'the movie is ideal for children' and as a
reason for drawing the opposite conclusion. But why draw the opposite conclusion? A plausible
explanation, I believe, is that in the opinion of the proponent of Argument 2* the conjunction of
the premises of Argument 2* is a stronger reason for the claim that it's not the case that you ought
to take your son to the movie than is the reason for the claim that it is the case that you ought to
take your son to the movie, namely that the movie is ideal for children. This judgment could be
expressed by saying that the conjunction of the premises of Argument 2* outweighs the premise
of Argument 1.
Here then we have a case in which the conjunction of two reasons (the premises of Argument
2*) is deployed both as an undercutting defeater of an argument (Argument 1) and (or so I think
plausible) as an outweighing reason - a reason that the proponent of Argument 2* considers to
outweigh the reason given in Argument 1 for the conclusion 'you ought to take your son to the
movie.' It seems to me that Xie should consider expanding his remarks on "an outweighing
relation" so as to allow for the possibility of such a case. I think he could do so consistently with
holding that "an outweighing relation makes sense only when we are considering two (sets of)
reasons that support respectively conflicting conclusions (A and not-A)" (p. 6).
3. "k even though q; because p"
According to Hansen, "the argument schema 'k even though q; because p' implies (i) that k is a
conclusion and q is a set of reasons oriented against, or away from[,] k, and (ii) that p is a set of
reasons oriented toward k, and (iii) that p is a stronger consideration than q" (2011, p. 45). Xie
calls (iii) "the on-balance premise," and says:
Here I think a noteworthy inferential leap is taken from a comparison of strength within
the even-though conjunction (i.e., k is stronger than q) to another one that goes beyond
the conjunction (i.e., p is stronger than q). It is … unclear how the former, even if being
correctly confirmed, could be used to establish the latter. More specifically, although
in such an argument schema it can be said that p and q do have opposite orientations,
they do not form an even-though conjunction in any way[;] thus their being of unequal
strength remains unknown, or still needs to be uncovered by some other linguistic
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clues. Therefore … I think Hansen's analysis of "even though" based on Ducrot's
notion of "orientation" … fails to provide a linguistic groundwork for validating the
presence of [an] on-balance premise in third-pattern conductive arguments. (p. 10,
omissions his).
I don't think Hansen makes the inferential leap that Xie thinks he does. For one thing, his
argument schema doesn't commit him to the claim that k is stronger than q. For k to be stronger
than q, there would need to be some further proposition such that k was a stronger reason for it
than q was against it, but Hansen's schema doesn't include any such proposition. Furthermore, in
his schema k is simply a conclusion; it isn't a reason (or, and this is to be understood hereafter, a
set of reasons) for any proposition, and so, a fortiori, it isn't a stronger reason for some further
proposition than reason q is against that proposition.
Hansen thinks that in his schema p is presented as being a stronger set of reasons for k than
q is against k. If the opposite were true (i.e., if q were presented as being a stronger set of reasons
against k than p is for k), the conclusion of the schema would be not-k rather than k. Since the
conclusion is k rather than not-k, the schema implies that p (the set of reasons for k) is a stronger
consideration than q, which is oriented against k.
Nevertheless, I agree that there is a problem. On Hansen's interpretation of an even-though
conjunction, 'k even though q' implies that k and q have opposite orientations: q is oriented against
k, so k must be oriented toward itself since its orientation is the opposite of q's. But in Hansen's
schema, to repeat, k isn't a reason for any proposition, hence it isn't a reason for itself and so it isn't
oriented toward itself. Nor is there a further proposition in the schema which k is oriented toward
and q is oriented against. However, consider the following example:
r Amy will win her college's physics prize because k she will do very well on her
physics exam even though q she hasn't studied for it, since p she has a remarkable
aptitude for the subject.
In this example, k and q have opposite orientations: k is directly oriented toward r, and q is
indirectly oriented against r by virtue of being directly oriented against k.
To generalize. The propositions k and q in the conjunction 'k even though q' have opposite
orientations just in case there is some further proposition which k is directly oriented toward and
q is indirectly oriented against by virtue of being directly oriented against k. If there is no such
further proposition in the argument concerned, then k doesn't have an orientation opposite to that
of q since it isn't presented as a reason for itself, nor is it a reason for itself.
In a case in which there is no proposition with respect to which k and q have opposite
orientations, the opposite-orientation analysis of third-pattern conductions will not apply to k and
q in Hansen's schema but it will apply to p and q in his schema because p is oriented toward k and
q is oriented against k. Furthermore, an instantiation of the schema will imply that in the arguer's
judgment p is a stronger set of reasons for k than q is against k, hence that p outweighs q.

4. Two examples of on-balance legal reasoning
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Background information. In R. v. Keegstra (1990), the Supreme Court of Canada had to decide
whether s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code of Canada was constitutionally valid. This provision of the
Code prohibited the wilful promotion of hatred against an identifiable group, other than in private
conversation. The Court agreed that s. 319(2) infringed the freedom of expression guarantee of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (s. 2(b)). The question which then arose was whether
it could nevertheless be saved under s. 1 of the Charter as "a reasonable limit" on that freedom
"prescribed by law and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." Answering this
question required the application of a three-part proportionality test. The third part entails "a
weighing of the importance of the state objective [in enacting the legislation concerned] against
the effects of limits imposed upon a Charter right or guarantee."
The Court upheld the constitutional validity of s. 319(2) by a margin of 4-3.
Example (1). One of the dissenting judges argued that the infringement by s. 319(2) of
the Charter guarantee of freedom of expression was of "the most serious nature,"
whereas on "the other side of the scale … the claims of gains to be achieved at the cost
of the infringement of free speech represented by s. 319(2) [were] tenuous." She added:
"In my opinion, the result is clear. Any questionable benefit of the legislation is
outweighed by the significant infringement on the constitutional guarantee of free
expression effected by s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code" (R. v. Keegstra (1990), n.p.;
McLachlin J. (dissenting), Analysis, IV, A(d)). This assessment was a premise in the
judge's argument for the conclusion that s. 319(2) could not be upheld under s. 1 of the
Charter as a reasonable limit prescribed by law and demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society. Here, then, we have an example of an explicit on-balance
premise in third-pattern conductive reasoning. Thus, an on-balance premise in such
reasoning isn't always an implicit premise.
A transitional matter. A figurative weighing of reasons for and against some claim
can result in the negative judgment that, for example, the reasons against the claim do
not outweigh the reasons for it. In this event, there are two possibilities: the reasons
for and against the claim may be judged to be of equal weight, or the reasons for the
claim may be judged to outweigh those against it.
Example (2). One of the majority judges in Keegstra wrote that "[t]he effects of s.
319(2), involving as they do the restriction of expression largely removed from the
heart of free expression values, are not of such a deleterious nature as to outweigh any
advantage gleaned from the limitation of s. 2(b)" – the freedom of expression guarantee
(R. v. Keegstra (1990), n.p.; Dickson C.J., VII, D (iv)). This do-not-outweigh judgment
was an explicit on-balance premise in the judge's overall argument that s. 319(2) was
constitutionally valid. He clearly did not intend it to be understood as implying that
the impairment-of-expression effects of s. 319(2) were equal in weight to any
advantage gleaned from the provision's limitation of freedom of expression, but as
implying that any advantage so gleaned outweighed the provision's impairment-ofexpression effects, for he said that those effects were not of "a most serious nature,"
whereas the objective of s. 319(2), namely, the "dissipation of racism," was of
"enormous importance.
5. Conclusion
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I believe that Xie has raised important issues with respect to the on-balance premise in a thirdpattern conductive argument and has made a valuable contribution to their discussion. I have
suggested that he consider expanding his remarks on "an outweighing relation" so as to allow for
the possibility of a case of the sort I described in section 2. As I indicated in section 3, I am not
persuaded by his "inferential leap" criticism of Hansen. Nor am I persuaded that in a third-pattern
conduction there is always an implicit on-balance premise; the counter-examples given in section
4 show that an on-balance premise in such an argument isn't always implicit.
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